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ECONOMIC FORECASTS DURING THE PANDEMIC

Looking Forward While Being Pushed Back:
How Accurate Were Economic Forecasts for Maine during
the Pandemic?
by Andrew Crawley and Angela Hallowell

months before traditional measures such
as gross domestic product (GDP) or
Economic forecasting is a challenging process, and how we understand the fuemployment are available (Fiske et al.
ture often relies on what we have seen in the past. As COVID-19 case numbers
1991). Indicators such as monthly
began to increase, economies were forced to shutter and stay-at-home orders
employment weren’t available for two
were implemented. Here, we compare our initial forecasts for output, employmonths after the initial shock; meanwhile,
ment, and tax revenue to actual values for 2020. Overall Maine’s economy was
other indicators like GDP and personal
more resilient than our forecasts first predicted, with tax revenues far exceeding
income for the second quarter weren’t
the initial projections. However, when the numbers are explored further, it bereleased until July and September, respeccomes clear that federal funds were a critical lifeline during turbulent times, and
tively. At the time of writing in May 2021,
without this support, the damage to Maine would have been far more severe.
we still await official data about other
indicators such as poverty rates, household
income, or migration.
INTRODUCTION
Furthermore, when official data were released, they
were subject to significant revisions as social distancing
he rapid global spread of COVID-19 plunged nations
measures affected survey response rates and led to the
into uncharted economic territory. As case numbers
misclassification of workers, and therefore increased error
rose, people’s behaviors changed, and governments issued
margins.1 Faced with all these challenges, economists
stay-at-home orders. Never in modern economic history
turned to novel real-time data such as cell phone informahad nations been forced to shut down swaths of their econtion on people’s travel-to-work patterns and Google search
omies, resulting in dramatic unemployment and structural
trends on whether people were researching filing for unemchanges to industries. Even more remarkable was the pace
ployment (see, for example, the work of Brough et al.
at which this occurred, with major shocks being felt over
2020; Larson and Sinclair 2021).
a six-week period. As it became clear that the pandemic
This paper presents original forecasts made using these
was creating significant economic challenges, there was a
novel data during April and May of 2020 for GDP, unemgreater need to forecast how long these effects would last
ployment, and tax revenue for Maine. Throughout March
and what the long-term impacts of shut downs would be.
2020, information regarding the pandemic was changing
Economic forecasting is challenging at the best of
daily. In Maine, the first COVID-19 case was reported on
times, but attempting to forecast dynamic, fast-moving
March 12, 2020. Although the governor’s Stay Healthy at
activity with incomplete information presents unpreceHome Executive Order did not take effect until three
dented issues. Economic forecasting is unique compared to
weeks later, on April 2, 2020, Maine’s response time line
other forms of forecasting in the sense that forecasters are
shows that new precautionary measures took effect every
forced to show their hand in almost real-time as they
day through the end of March.2 Since then, the pandemic
generate their forecasts. The product of these forecasts are
has played out in ways both expected and unexpected; the
usually observable against reality within a short time frame,
duration of the pandemic and social-distancing measures,
thus any mistakes are evident almost immediately (Elliott
the severity of illness, federal and state fiscal policy, vacciand Timmermann 2008). Economic forecasting is highly
nation rollouts, and even the weather have affected
constrained by data availability, and it usually takes
Abstract

T
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figure 1:

OUTPUT

A

nation’s output is usually one of the first barometers people use to assess how well it performs
economically. GDP provides a snapshot of monetary
or market value of all finished goods and services
produced within a country’s borders in a specific time
period (Sutton et al. 2007). During the start of the
pandemic, GDP was expected to collapse; the bigger
challenge was to estimate when it would recover. No
modern economy had previously seen such a hard
stop occur, thus we had no prior comparison to use as
a model for forecasting its impact. While policymakers
and academics alike faced this paucity of data, a team
at Harvard and Brown Universities proposed one
immediate solution: the Opportunity Insights Economic
Tracker (Chetty et al. 2020), which provides real-time
open-source information.
The tracker is built using anonymized data from
private companies, such as credit card processors and
payroll firms, from which they construct statistics on
consumer spending, employment rates, and other indicators by county, industry, and (precrisis) income level. We
used a two-stage procedure to convert the data from this
tracker to a usable form. First, real-time trends were linked
to individual sectors, which allowed us to obtain perspective on the likely direction and magnitude of sector
changes. We then used up-to-date information on sectoral
changes (as of May 2020) to proportion how long these
effects were likely to last, based on COVID-19 case
numbers and transmission rates. Once we had formulated
these inputs, we used the IMPLAN model to estimate the
effect of these scenarios on total output.
IMPLAN is the acronym for “IMpact analysis for
PLANing,” a well-established and widely used economic
model that uses input-output analyses and accounts for
over 500 industries to estimate regional and industryspecific economic impacts (for more details about this
model see Crawley and Welch 2017). Figure 1 displays the
forecast along with the historic growth trend (representing
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growth had there been no pandemic) along with the actual
real GDP recorded for Maine 2020.
First, it must be noted the significant effect the
COVID-19 pandemic had on output for the state of
Maine. If the pandemic had not occurred, the economy
would be significantly bigger than it is now. Real chaineddollar GDP was just over $56 billion in 2020, marginally
above the original forecast of $55 billion made in May
2020. This reflects a relatively successful forecast and shows
how output can be understood by looking at individual
sectors’ real-time performance. A bigger question remains
in how long it will take for the economy to return to its
previous growth path, which is more complex to answer.
COVID-19 has fundamentally changed how certain
sectors such as hospitality and business services operate,
the latter now contending with remote working and the
former with social distancing and consumer behavior
changes. Some initial evidence suggests changes are here to
stay. Barrero et al. (2021), after conducting a survey of
more than 30,000 Americans, found that 30 percent of
workers would be working at home in some shape or form
postpandemic. Spencer and Ashburn (2021) found an
average decrease in rental income by more than 12 percent
from Q1 to Q4 of 2020. The decrease suggests that many
companies might be closing brick-and-mortar locations.
Finally, there is anecdotal evidence that food and delivery
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UNEMPLOYMENT/EMPLOYMENT
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figure 2:
Google Trend in Maine “File for Unemployment”

services will continue to thrive as consumer behavior
has permanently changed.3 Academic work by
Crawley (2014) prior to the pandemic found the
commute times affected workers utility; this fact,
coupled with structural economic changes, presents
a new economic reality that the state of Maine will
have to deal with in the future.

mong the most immediate economic impacts
felt from the pandemic was a rise in unemployment. As many businesses were forced to close,
workers were laid off or furloughed for an unknown
period of time. In the week ending March 21,
2020, the first week that COVID-19 significantly
affected unemployment, over 21,000 Mainers filed
initial claims for unemployment assistance. To
put this number in context, prior to COVID-19,
Maine’s worst week for unemployment insurance claims
was in the second week of July 1991, when over 11,000
individuals filed initial claims. By the end of April 2020,
over 12 percent of eligible workers in Maine were withdrawing unemployment benefits, the most in the state’s
history (although that would eventually climb to over 27
percent by the end of May 2020).
The rapidity with which COVID-19 led to recordbreaking unemployment cannot be overexaggerated. Our
early forecasts carried the assumption that the public
health situation, including social-distancing measures,
would be the primary driver of labor market outcomes. As
with GDP, official unemployment data are highly lagged.
However, initial unemployment insurance claims data, an
administrative data source, are available with only a
one-week lag. In addition to these data, we also used a
more novel metric to capture the developing unemployment situation: Google Trends data similar to the work of
Goldsmith-Pinkham and Sojourner (2020). Figure 2
depicts the trends for the search term “file for unemployment” in Maine over the period February 2020 to June
2020.
These real-time data were incredibly useful to obtain
the pulse of the labor market during this period. Using
these real-time data and following the work of Gascon
(2020), we used occupational employment statistics (OES)
to estimate the number of workers who were at risk of
unemployment. We categorized workers in three ways: (1)
12
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essential workers, (2) workers likely able to work from
home, and (3) high-risk workers, typically those with high
contact and little ability to work from home. Our ability
to categorize these workers depended on our understanding of public health measures and regulations targeted
towards social distancing, and in many cases assumptions
were based on anecdotes. We found that approximately 31
percent of Maine’s workforce was at risk of becoming
unemployed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Figure 3
breaks down this estimated loss of employment by industry.
Depending on the rate at which high-risk workers became
unemployed, this would translate to a state unemployment
rate of between 14 percent and 30 percent during Q2 of
2020. These estimates also predicted that the impacts
would be highly disproportionate across industries and
wage levels.
The analysis highlighted that the losses would be
greatest in hospitality; retail; agriculture; and arts, entertainment, and recreation, where between 44 percent and
92 percent of workers were at risk of unemployment.
Additionally, under this framework, we were able to estimate that nearly 80 percent of at-risk workers had annual
salaries under $40,000, and nearly half of at-risk workers
had annual salaries between $25,000 and $30,000. Figure
4 displays the official and adjusted unemployment rate for
Maine over the course of the last year.
Early in the pandemic, when uncertainty was high
and data were scarce, misclassification of those who were
unemployed was common.4 To this end, the Maine
MAINE POLICY REVIEW • Vol. 30, No. 2 • 2021
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figure 3:

Estimated Loss of Employment by Industry
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figure 4:

Unemployment Rates for Maine
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Department of Labor estimated an unemployment
rate holding the labor force participation rate
constant. The result was a much higher figure with
unemployment topping out at 14.2 percent in April
2020 but then steadily falling.
This was a difficult forecast given the paucity of
data available at the time and the uncertainty
around vaccination and stay-at-home orders.
However, the adjusted rate was inside the margin of
error of our original forecast. What fueled our initial
forecast for unemployment was the occupational
mix within the state. During March 2020 and April
2020, worst-case assumptions about which businesses and occupations would be stable during the
pandemic led to a more severe estimation than what
we actually saw. While our unemployment forecast
was realistic in the first months of the pandemic, it
was an overestimate for the summer and fall.
One of the other core drivers of this estimation
was the assumption that high unemployment would
lead to low expenditures. However, after the Paycheck
Protection Program (PPP) provided firms with funds
to maintain wages for furloughed workers, enhanced
unemployment programs such as Pandemic
Unemployment Assistance (PUA) and Federal
Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (FPUC)
supported those who lost jobs. With these streams of
federal aid, consumption remained fairly high, and
the economy continued to operate even as the pressures of the pandemic took hold.

Jul

Jan-21
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Jul

he final measure forecast was Maine’s tax
revenue, something that is traditionally highly
vulnerable to recessions. Historically during periods
of economic decline, the demand for durable goods
drops, individuals lose income, and corporations
report less profit. For example, in the fiscal year
ending June 30, 2009, during the last major US
downturn, Maine’s general fund revenues were down
9.0 percent, or $276 million compared to the
previous year, with over $200 million of that loss
attributed to individual income tax.5
However, the pandemic was not an ordinary
economic recession. The economy came to almost a
complete standstill as the result of public health
13
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concerns, shutdowns, and social-distancing measures. Each
of these factors alone could curtail output in the short run.
To complicate the situation, none of these factors was
economic in nature, which made their effect on consumption difficult to gauge. Primarily, the forecast was driven by
the assumption of a major decline in income tax revenue
due to historic losses of employment. We also expected
significant reductions in consumer spending, leading to
losses in sales tax revenue. To estimate these losses, we
again turned to the IMPLAN model previously described
and averaged the most significant assumption of job loss
across all the risky occupations. This translated to a forecast
of a 40 percent fall in employment across the risky
occupations.
Using occupational employment and wage estimates
by industry, we were able to calculate the fall in employee
compensation (wages and earnings) at the industry level.
We created a nonadjusted and an adjusted wage loss, with
the adjusted value offsetting sectoral wage loss by the total
anticipated unemployment benefit per sector. This allowed
wage-related revenue loss to be dampened as it was
replaced by unemployment benefits, which are traditionally taxable. Table 1 gives a detailed breakdown of the
forecast. Using the method outlined earlier, we projected
colossal impacts to total tax revenues. Total tax revenues
were projected to fall by approximately $358 million in the
calendar year 2020 after being adjusted for taxable unemployment benefits. Consumption was forecast to decline
by 28 percent.
This proved to be the most complex forecast that we
undertook, and our projections were significantly different
from the actual values Maine saw as indicated in Figure 5.
Why the forecasts were so far out has major lessons for the
state both in terms of forecasting and also from a policy
perspective. The known year-on-year (yoy) changes
between the fiscal year 2020 and the fiscal year through to
April 2021 show a decline in income tax revenue of -0.4
percent, thus a forecast error of over 20 percent. This large
discrepancy can be partly explained as a result of expanded
unemployment benefits such as FPUC, PUA, and the
Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Compensation
(PEUC). All of these programs expanded and significantly
broadened the eligibility and amount of unemployment
accessible to workers.
According to Federal Funds Information for States
(FFIS) tracking for state funding for COVID-19 as of
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table 1:

Revenue Forecast

Category

Forecast

Total jobs lost

65,728

Direct and induced consumption lost

28%

Wage loss
Not adjusted

($2,212,334,117)

Adjusted

($1,060,135,103)

Income tax loss

21%

Not adjusted

($772,719,079)

Adjusted

($358,386,884)

figure 5:
15%

Comparison of Tax Estimates
Estimated

Actual

Forecast Error

10%
5%

8.2%

-0.4%

0%
-5%
-10%
-15%
-20%

-21.0%

-20.6%
-28.0%
-36.2%

-25%
-30%
-35%
-40%

January 13, 2021, Mainers received over $1 billion in the
extra $600 payment (FPUC) alone. Between PUA and
PEUC, Mainers received $255 million.6 These funds are
astoundingly high, and this level of transfer benefit (federal
to state) has never been seen in modern times even during
the great recession of 2008–2009. This influx of money
also partly explains the differential in the sales tax forecast,
originally projected to fall 28 percent, it actually rose 8.2
percent, a forecast error of over 36 percent. The significantly larger expanded unemployment insurance dampened
the blow to both individual income tax revenues and
consumption, especially when coupled with Economic
Impact Payments from the CARES Act in 2020. The
CARES Act (March 2020) provided a one-time, direct
cash payment of up to $1,200 per person, plus $500 per
child for individuals earning less than $99,000 (or
$198,000 for joint filers).
MAINE POLICY REVIEW • Vol. 30, No. 2 • 2021
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The Consolidated Appropriations Act (December
2020) provided direct payments of $600 per person,
including for dependents ages 16 and younger. Finally, the
American Rescue Plan (March 2021) provided direct cash
payments of up to $1,400 for individuals.7 The majority of
these payments were income-dependent, but almost 96
percent of Mainers were eligible for these funds.8 All of
these direct payments undoubtedly allowed income to
remain higher than originally estimated due to workers
being furloughed and paid rather than laid off. Job losses
were also concentrated in the lowest-wage occupations,
with the hardest-hit sector being leisure and hospitality,
down 26 percent in 2020.
Finally, and more fundamentally going forward,
social-distancing measures and restrictions alone did not
cause consumers to stop spending. The work of Gabe and
Crawley (2021) found empirical evidence that consumers
altered their behavior far earlier than any formal restrictions were in place. E-commerce sales exploded as
consumers flocked to make purchases online and traditional brick-and-mortar businesses altered their way of
working, switching to more remote activities (Chaudhary
2020). There is also emerging evidence that even as the
pandemic eases, consumer behavior as well as business
practices will not return to business as usual (see for
example the work of Barnes [2020]). In the case of Maine,
this change presents challenges and opportunities for the
economy going forward.
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

T

his paper has provided a review of forecasts generated
right at the start of the pandemic from March to May
of 2020. They were made at a time of significant uncertainty and a dynamic changing environment, two things
that have large impacts on forecasting accuracy. However,
two of the three forecasts were fairly accurate, with both
output and unemployment being within the margin of
error in the short term. These indicators are good predictors
as to the overall direction of an economy, and our ability to
accurately forecast these even during a pandemic is beneficial. Our use of novel real-time data helped generate this
forecast, so we would recommend its continued use in the
future. In terms of the actual observed values for output
and unemployment, both are still well below/above their
historic growth path. This is a point of concern, and one
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that policymakers should be aware of. Additionally, the
labor market, although recovering, is still not operating
as efficiently as it once was; Maine was already struggling
to fill job vacancies prior to the pandemic, and it will
continue to be a challenge for the state.
Although our first two forecasts were relatively
successful, revenue was a different matter, and our projections were significantly wide of the mark. The biggest
contributing factor to this forecast’s errors was the major
stimulus given by the federal government. Our forecasts
could be looked upon as an a priori of what would have
occurred if these funds had not been made available, and
with that in mind, the importance of the funds cannot be
underestimated. Maine’s economy was able to weather the
worst of the short-term pandemic effects by maintaining
solid consumption growth and unemployment assistance.
But as these programs end, it is imperative that additional
support is available to ensure the long-term health of
Maine’s economy. Acknowledging changing consumer
behavior and business practices, the state must be ready to
support the development of new digital infrastructure as
well as training the new workforce.
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NOTES
1

For more details about the impact of COVID-19 on error
margins in labor market data, visit https://www.bls.gov
/covid19/effects-of-covid-19-pandemic-and-response-on-the
-employment-situation-news-release.htm#summaries.

2

For more detail, please refer to https://www.maine.gov
/covid19/timeline.

3

https://fortune.com/2021/04/20/restaurants-food-delivery
-apps-fees-commission-doordash-uber-eats-grubhub/

4

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/06/30
/who-are-the-potentially-misclassified-in-the-employment
-report/

5

https://www.maine.gov/osc/sites/maine.gov.osc/files/inline
-files/2009%2006%20Report.pdf

6

The complete report may be accessed here: https://ffis.org
/SPR/39/10.

7

For more details, please refer to https://www.usa.gov
/covid-stimulus-checks.

8

https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2020/04/28
/how-many-people-will-get-1200-in-every-state/111604090/
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